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Abstract
Background: The Orphan Drug Act is an important piece of legislation that uses financial incentives to encourage
the development of drugs that treat rare diseases. This analysis studies the effects of a portion of the Orphan Drug
Act, the orphan drug designation. Specifically, it studies the value that investors place on the orphan drug designation,
by investigating how investors react to companies’ announcing that their product has received the designation.
Results: The results, on average, show that the stock price of a company increases by 3.36% after the announcement
of the designation, increasing the value of the company. The results are more pronounced for oncology drugs, and
drugs being developed by the smallest companies.
Conclusion: The orphan designation appears to be successful at generating positive value for companies, as seen by
the positive and significant average increases in stock price.
Keywords: Orphan designation, Event study, Investors, FDA
Introduction
The orphan drug designation was created in 1983 when
the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) was enacted by Congress,
and is administered by the Office of Orphan Products
Development at the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The purpose of the designation was to create fi-
nancial incentives for companies to develop new drugs
and biologics for rare diseases. These incentives include
a partial tax credit for clinical trial expenditures, waived
user fees, and eligibility for 7 years of marketing exclu-
sivity [1]. It was hoped that these financial incentives
would lead to an increased number of orphan drugs
coming to market. Since the legislation was passed,
many studies of the effects of the ODA have been
undertaken, including analyses of trends in orphan
designation rates, new orphan drug approvals over
time, and the assessment of the benefits that have ac-
crued to patients with rare disease by the development
of these drugs [2–10].
This study seeks to measure an alternative area of the
ODA: how investors respond to the announcement of
an orphan drug designation. The goal of this analysis is
to obtain a proxy estimate for the value of the financial
incentives of the Act. If investors (i.e., individuals or in-
stitutions who purchase shares of the pharmaceutical
company’s stock) view the designation and associated
financial incentives as a positive benefit that increases a
company’s value, then there should be a corresponding
increase in the company’s stock price after the an-
nouncement of a designation. The aim of this study is
to determine whether there is a statistically significant
change in a company’s stock price after the announce-
ment of an orphan designation, and how the change
may differ based on drug or company characteristics.
Background
Event studies are a common analytical method in the fi-
nancial and economics literature to analyze the impact
of events (such as company-level announcements,
market shocks, legislation, etc) on stock prices [11–14].
While it is a lesser known method for public policy
analysis, event studies have been used to analyze other
types of announcements by pharmaceutical companies,
such as drug approvals [15–25].
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Various event studies have been conducted to analyze
how announcements by pharmaceutical companies in-
fluence stock price. For example, the approval of a new
drug has been shown to boost stock prices by between
0.35 and 1.53%, and positive Phase III clinical trial re-
sults increase stock prices by 1.56% [17–20, 26]. The
small effect for the most important step, approval itself,
is best explained as indicating that events later in a
drug’s life-cycle may cause smaller effects, because so
much of the information on the likelihood of a drug’s
approval was incorporated into the stock price at an
earlier time [18].
One mechanism by which this information might be
incorporated early is through the announcement of news
events that provide a “signal” to investors that the drug
may produce financial value in the future. For example,
the fast-track designation is similar to the orphan drug
designation, in that it is given to new indications of
drugs (both approved and unapproved), must be applied
for to FDA by the company, and must meet congres-
sionally mandated criteria [27]. In order to receive the
fast-track designation, the drug must treat a serious con-
dition, and meet an unmet medical need [27]. However,
unlike the orphan designation, the fast-track designation
does not provide the company with any explicit financial
benefits for developing its drug. (The benefits of a fast-
track designation include the availability of more fre-
quent meetings with the FDA, as well as the use of a
rolling review when submitting a marketing application
for a new drug.)
For the fast-track designation, the most recent event
study estimated an average stock price increase of 6.25%
after the announcement of the designation occurred
[15]. Studies conducted in the earliest years of the pro-
gram found increases of between 9 and 10% [16, 28].
These are both large effects, and seem to indicate that
investors place strong, positive value on the information
conveyed by the announcement of a fast-track designa-
tion, and therefore believe that it warrants an increase in
the company’s value. Given that the orphan designation
provides information, as well as tangible financial incen-
tives, investors should react to its announcement in a
similar manner to that of a fast-track designation. How-
ever, no previous studies of the orphan designation
could be found.
Study data and methods
Analysis
Event studies typically define an “event” as a public
announcement that affects either a single company or
multiple companies simultaneously. For this analysis, the
event is a company’s public announcement that it has re-
ceived an orphan designation from the FDA for one of its
drugs. [A full outline of the methods used for this study is
available in the technical appendix found in the Additional
file 1.] To estimate the size of the investor reaction to the
announcement, this study uses the market model. First, a
predicted value is created, which estimates the stock re-
turn that would be expected in the absence of the event.
This value is then compared to the actual returns.
A predicted value of the company’s stock price on the
day of the announcement is constructed using a set of
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. The
prediction utilizes the company’s daily stock prices in
the 6 months leading up to the announcement, as well
as the market returns from the S&P 500 composite
index during the same period, to control for market-
level fluctuations.
Once this prediction has been generated using the re-
gression, it is compared to the actual stock price on the
day of the announcement. The difference between these
two numbers is the “abnormal return” of the stock,
which is the value that investors place on the event—in
this case, the announcement of the orphan designation.
The abnormal returns are created for each event, and
then summed to create the “cumulative abnormal
returns” or CARs—which is the average value of the an-
nouncement of the orphan designation. The statistical
significance of the CARs is determined using a non-
parametric generalized rank t-test; specifically, the
GRANK-T test [29].
The central analysis of this paper determines the
magnitude and statistical significance of the CARs for
the orphan designation announcement over the whole
study period, 1983—2015. Additionally, to further in-
vestigate whether there are any differential effects based
on drug type or company size, the data are sub-divided
for two additional analyses. First, the observations are
split by whether the drug is indicated for an oncology
or non-oncology indication. A drug is determined to be
for an oncology indication if the primary indication of
the drug, for the orphan designation, is an oncology
therapeutic. Palliative, supportive and diagnostic agents
for cancer are not included in this category. All other
indications are determined to be “non-oncology”. This
analysis is also split longitudinally (periods 1985—2005
versus 2006—2015) to identify any trends over time,
given the potentially changing nature of the drug devel-
opment process.
Second, the observations are sub-divided by company
size. Companies are classified into four categories using
market capitalization (i.e., the current price of a share of
a company’s stock multiplied by the number of out-
standing shares) as a proxy for company size: less than
$50 million, known as nano-cap companies; between
$50 and $250 million known as micro-caps; between
$250 million and $2 billion, known as small-caps; and,
greater than $2 billion, known as mid-caps or large-caps.
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Data
The FDA orphan designation announcements were found
via a systematic search of LexisNexis (a comprehensive
news and legal database). A total of 1085 announcements
were found, spanning the years 1985—2015. Four exclu-
sion criteria were applied to the data, primarily to ensure
that stock data existed for the observation, and to ensure
that no confounding company-level events occurred sim-
ultaneously with the announcement. [A detailed descrip-
tion of the exclusion criteria can be found in the technical
appendix in the Additional file 1.] The exclusion criteria
removed a total of 762 observations, and the final sample
size was 323 observations for the overall and oncology
analyses. There was missing market-cap data for 76 com-
panies, leaving a final sample size of 247 observations for
the firm size analysis.
Stock data were obtained from the Center for Research
in Securities Prices (CRSP), including both the data for
individual companies, and for the S&P 500 Composite
Index. Market capitalization data were obtained from
Compustat.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study is its limited
generalizability to all companies that develop orphan
drugs, because the study is only able to include products
developed by companies that are listed on a US stock
exchange. The study is therefore not necessarily
generalizable to private companies, or companies traded
outside of the US. A second limitation of this study is
the small sample size of some of the analyses. While not
a problem for the event study analysis, the sample sizes
may limit the GRANK-T test’s ability to detect statistical
significance.
Results
The results of the event study are presented in Table 1.
The CARs over the entire study period are 3.36%.
This means that, on average, a company’s stock price
increases by 3.36% after the announcement of an or-
phan designation over what it would have been had
the announcement not occurred. The GRANK-T test
statistic on this estimate is statistically significant at
the 5% level.
In the second analysis, overall CARs for the oncology
announcements are 3.78% (statistically significant at the
5% level) and are 2.91% (not statistically significant) for
the non-oncology announcements. When these groups
are split longitudinally, we find the CARs increase over
time for the oncology orphan designations, and decrease
for the non-oncology orphan designations. The CARs
for the oncology announcements are 3.47% versus 3.98%
for the earlier versus later period (neither is statistically
significant). The CARs for the non-oncology announce-
ments are 3.28% (statistically significant at the 5% level)
versus 2.62% (not statistically significant) for the earlier
versus later period.
Finally, in the third analysis, the CARs decrease signifi-
cantly as the size of the market capitalization of the
company increases. The CARs are 8.87% for the nano-
caps, 4.25% for the micro-caps, 0.15% for the small-caps,
and −0.20% for the mid- and large-caps. (None of these
are statistically significant.)
Wilcoxon rank sum tests were used to examine
whether the differences between any of the groups in
the study were statistically significant. No statistical sig-
nificance was found, although this may be due partially
to the small sample sizes, as the magnitude of the dif-
ferences are suggestive.
Table 1 Results of Analyses
Study Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) GRANK-T Test Statistic (p-value)
Analysis 1 (n = 323) 3.36% 2.41 a (0.992)
Analysis 2
Oncology (n = 169) 3.78% 2.07 a (0.976)
1985–2005 (n = 67) 3.47% 1.09 (0.862)
2006–2015 (n = 102) 3.98% 1.73 (0.958)
Non-oncology (n = 154) 2.91% 1.57 (0.942)
1985–2005 (n = 67) 3.28% 2.17 a (0.985)
2006–2015 (n = 87) 2.62% 0.86 (0.805)
Analysis 3
Nano-cap: Market cap <$50 m (n = 40) 8.87% 1.02 (0.846)
Micro-cap: Market cap >$50 m & < $250 m (n = 94) 4.25% 1.50 (0.933)
Small-cap: Market cap >$250 m & < $2b (n = 92) 0.15% 0.40 (0.655)
Mid- & Large-cap: Market cap >$2b (n = 21) −0.20% −0.17 (0.433)
astatistically significant at the 5% level
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Discussion
The success of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) has been
measured in numerous ways since it was enacted in
1983. The key purpose of the ODA is to use economic
incentives to induce companies to develop drugs for rare
diseases. This analysis seeks to understand whether in-
vestors in the pharmaceutical companies developing
these drugs place a positive value on the orphan desig-
nation. To do this, the study uses positive stock price
changes as a proxy measure for the value that investors
place on the financial incentives of the Act. While the
analysis cannot determine the exact value that investors
place on the designation, nor the incentives that they
value most, it can study the direction and magnitude of
their attitudes toward the designation, and its corre-
sponding financial incentives.
The study finds that investors in pharmaceutical com-
panies view the orphan designation as a signal of higher
company value. The overall CARs show an average
increase in a company’s stock price of 3.36% after the
announcement of an orphan designation (over what it
was predicted to have been had the announcement not
occurred). Negative CARs would have indicated that in-
vestors do not find economic value in the designation,
and would potential dissuade companies from continu-
ing to develop orphan drugs. However, the fact that large
and positive CARs are found in the analysis implies that
investors find value in the development of these drugs,
which may lead to continued development.
The magnitude of the CARs in this study is almost
double the maximum CARs that have been found in
studies of drug approvals; however, it is almost half of
what has been found in studies of the fast-track designa-
tion [8–14]. It is not surprising that the orphan designa-
tion produces higher CARs than a drug approval;
orphan designation typically occurs early in the drug
development process (sometimes even in the preclinical
phase) and is therefore more valuable to investors be-
cause they have little other information regarding the
drug and its likelihood of success.
However, it is surprising that the orphan designation
produces only half the stock response of a fast-track des-
ignation. It may not be immediately intuitive why this
should be true, given that both are FDA drug designa-
tions. The fast-track designation conveys no explicit fi-
nancial benefits to companies that receive it, whereas
the orphan drug designation does convey tangible finan-
cial benefits (both immediately and in the future). How-
ever, it is possible that investors’ reactions to the orphan
designation are more tempered than their reaction to
the fast-track designation because of the historically
smaller potential for sales of most orphan drugs. Because
orphan drugs, by definition, treat rare diseases, the num-
ber of potential patients who might purchase the drug is
limited (although the high price of some orphan drugs
in recent years is changing this paradigm) [30]. In con-
trast, drugs receiving the fast-track designation often
have very large potential markets and, therefore, greater
potential to be highly profitable for the firm and inves-
tors (i.e. increase the valuation multiple of these
companies).
It is also possible that investor value is lower for or-
phan designations because it is conferred so early in the
development process. It has been well documented that,
on average, drugs in earlier stages of development are
more likely to fail than drugs in later phases [31]. There-
fore, it is possible that this lower valuation simply signals
that orphan drugs, which tend to be in earlier stages of
development when they are designated as compared
with drugs receiving a fast-track designation, are viewed
as more risky by investors (i.e. increase the discount rate
of future earnings).
The results from the second analysis provide evidence
that investors value oncology orphan drugs more than
they do non-oncology orphan drugs. Over the entire
study period, the oncology drugs have average CARs of
3.78% when the orphan designation was announced, as
compared to 2.91% for non-oncology drugs. While the
difference between these two results seems small in
magnitude, a 0.8 percentage point (or approximately
30%) difference is sizable for an event study. It is not
clear exactly what is driving this result. It is well known
that oncology drugs are typically able to charge high
prices and may also have non-orphan oncology markets
that they can expand into, increasing their market size
and therefore sales [32, 33]. However, this is also true
for many non-oncology orphan drugs. It appears though,
that when the data is broken out in this manner, inves-
tors believe that oncology orphan drugs will provide
more value to companies (i.e. increase the projected
earnings base).
The second analysis also shows a change in investor’s
reactions to these orphan drugs over time, although it is
less dramatic in magnitude than the overall comparison
of oncology vs non-oncology drugs. Over the two time
periods studied, 1985—2005 & 2006—2015, the CARs of
the oncology group increase 15%, while the CARs of the
non-oncology group decrease by 20%.
The results also show a striking difference in investor
reactions to the orphan drug designation when broken
out by company size. For the smallest companies, the
nano-caps with less than $50 million in market cap, the
CARs are almost 9%, while for the largest companies,
with a market cap of greater than $10 billion, the CARs
are negative 0.2%.
Overall, it is not surprising that smaller companies
show higher gains than larger ones. Large companies
may have multiple drugs under development, or have
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already approved drugs, which leads to more frequent
announcements to investors, and a lower likelihood that
any single announcement would lead to a significant
change in stock price. However, nano- and micro-cap
companies likely only have one product under develop-
ment, and no approved drugs, so any information (posi-
tive or negative) regarding the product will be important
information for investors (especially when projecting
discounted future earnings of the companies).
Policy implications
From a policy perspective, two main questions need to
be answered in order to assess the success of the ODA.
First, did the act actually result in new orphan drugs be-
ing developed? And second, is the overall cost of the
program worth the benefits, in terms of output? This
analysis explores part of the former question, by asses-
sing whether investors in companies developing orphan
drugs perceive these types of drugs as a good use of
firm research dollars. The positive stock reaction to the
announcement of orphan designations provides solid
evidence that investors view research and development
of orphan drugs to be of positive value to the company.
Had negative returns been found, it would have signaled
that investors believed that the companies would lose
money developing these drugs, which in turn may have
discouraged future investment. The positive signals by
investors that were found indicate that companies will
continue development in this space.
However, the results also show that the orphan desig-
nation does not seem to have a homogeneous incentive
effect. It is clear that, at least in terms of stock gains, the
greatest incentives fall to oncology drugs, and drugs be-
ing developed by the smallest companies.
This result is not necessarily a negative feature of the
orphan designation. For instance, one of the main finan-
cial incentives of the ODA, the tax credits for clinical
trials, can be used only if the company has made a
profit, and therefore has tax liabilities. (The tax credit
can also be carried forward for 20 years, so companies
can use the credit when they begin making profits, and
it may be partly transferred if they merge or are sold to
a company with a tax liability.) As discussed, the nano-
and micro-cap companies rarely have a drug on the
market, and therefore have no profits. So this stock price
increase may be an important non-explicit financial in-
centive to these companies.
The increased stock price incentive for the develop-
ment of an orphan oncology drug versus other types of
orphan drugs is worth noting. Given the difference in
CARs, it may be that non-oncology drugs are implicitly
receiving a lower value of financial incentives for their
development. The seriousness of this difference is not
readily apparent. This study cannot determine whether
fewer non-oncology, rare disease drugs are being devel-
oped, or even whether the magnitude of this difference
is significant to companies or their investors; however, it
warrants further study.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to study whether the Or-
phan Drug Act has been successful in incentivizing drug
development for rare diseases, by analyzing the investor
valuation of the orphan designation. The results indicate
that the designation has been successful in this area:
investors place positive, statistically significant, value on
the orphan drug designation. These results were espe-
cially pronounced for oncology drugs and the smallest
companies.
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